Comment of the Refugee Advocacy Lab: Submitted in Opposition to the Department of Homeland Security’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants
April 24, 2026
Re: Department of Homeland Security Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants (Feb. 23, 2026), DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0370, RIN 1615-AC97
To Whom It May Concern:
The Refugee Advocacy Lab respectfully submits this comment in opposition to the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) February 23, 2026 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, See Employment Authorization Reform for Asylum Applicants, 91 Fed. Reg. 8,616 (Feb. 23, 2026) (DHS Docket No. USCIS-2025-0370) (“Proposed Rule” or “NPRM”). On behalf of local partners in Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Virginia, the Refugee Advocacy Lab requests that DHS withdraw the Proposed Rule in full because it would make seeking asylum economically impossible for most people and have significant detrimental impacts on local communities, businesses, and the economy across these states.
I. The Refugee Advocacy Lab’s Interest in the Proposed Rule and Firsthand Experience Supporting Workforce Participation for New Arrivals
The Refugee Advocacy Lab supports local partners in ten states to advance policies that ensure the economic inclusion of refugees and immigrants. Lab States are home to more than 6.6 million immigrants, which we estimate includes at least 493,000 asylum seekers, of whom we believe at least 246,000 are likely to have employment authorization at present.(1) Asylum seeker have enriched the states where they live in myriad ways. They work in critical industries like construction, hospitality, retail, manufacturing and more.(2) They pay $14 billion in state and local taxes annually and contribute to the vitality of our local communities, including through $108 billion in spending power annually.(3) They bring their cultures, perspectives and experiences that enrich our social fabric. They are our neighbors, our co-workers, and our friends.
Under federal law, a person who has applied for asylum must obtain an employment authorization document (“EAD” or “work permit”) before they can be lawfully employed. Asylum seekers therefore rely on work permits to support themselves and participate in the authorized labor force while their claims are adjudicated. This process typically takes years. For decades, Congress, DHS, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) maintained a predictable framework for asylum-based work authorization, recognizing that it would be inappropriate to require people seeking protection to wait indefinitely before being allowed to work.(4)
Across the United States, according to estimates by Fwd.US, more than four percent of all workers in construction and building or grounds maintenance are asylum seekers.(5) In Georgia, experts estimate that 30,000 asylum seekers work in construction, with another 17,000 employed in leisure and hospitality.(6) In Ohio and Pennsylvania, asylum seekers, along with other immigrants, have played a critical role in growing our populations – and in several communities, reversing or stemming what would otherwise be population decline. In North Carolina, asylum seekers add an estimated $3.4 billion to the economy and pay $522 million in federal and payroll taxes and $415 million in state and local taxes.(7)
Prompt, predictable work authorization is critical to enable newcomers to support themselves while contributing to local businesses and strengthening our economies. In fact, even the current 150-day waiting period is too long; in 2022-23, states mobilized to help asylum seeker residents apply for employment authorization at the earliest opportunity, but onboarding lawful workers still lags behind workforce needs.(8) This NPRM moves in the opposite direction, pushing workers out of the legal economy, while increasing economic and social instability for entire communities. On behalf of the ten states where we work on the ground, the Refugee Advocacy Lab urges DHS to instead focus on solutions that promote economic integration, stability, self-sufficiency, and workforce growth.
The states where we work receive and support asylum seekers in their community. Because these states would bear the consequences of this Proposed Rule’s harm to residents and the economy, the Refugee Advocacy Lab has a substantial interest in this rulemaking.
II. The Proposed Rule Would Inflict Severe Harms on Lab States’ Residents
The Proposed Rule’s layered and harsh restrictions on work permits for asylum seekers would mean that people with asylum claims could not support themselves. This would likely result in people abandoning their claims and returning to countries where they have a fear of facing serious harm. The resulting harms to state and local residents would be severe.
First, the NPRM would substantially delay access to initial work permits in multiple, reinforcing ways. It would extend the waiting period to apply from 150 to 365 days and allow at least 180 days thereafter for adjudication, effectively requiring asylum seekers to wait at least 18 months before working.(9) It would further impose delays and obstacles by expanding USCIS’s ability to reject applications on technical grounds and eliminating safeguards that prevent indefinite delay.(10) Along with the NPRM’s independent proposal to pause new work permit processing for decades,(11) these changes would prevent many applicants from ever obtaining work authorization.
Second, the NPRM would grant USCIS broad discretion to deny work permits even where applicants meet eligibility criteria, replacing a predictable framework that has been in place for over thirty years.(12) Together with longer wait periods, this creates systemic uncertainty around work authorization, making it functionally impossible for asylum seekers and employers to plan for stable workforce participation.
Third, the NPRM imposes multiple new bars to work authorization, many of which would disqualify asylum seekers from working lawfully. These include bars tied to nuanced asylum eligibility standards, as well as unrelated deterrence measures, such as restrictions based on manner of entry and strict penalties for missing appointments. Additional provisions would require repeated biometrics appointments and allow USCIS to use undefined “derogatory information” found in work permit applications to prioritize asylum cases it expects to deny. This would further delay adjudication of strong asylum claims. In practice, these provisions would prevent large numbers of eligible asylum seekers from working lawfully for years, or at all. DHS itself acknowledges these measures may lead bona fide asylum seekers to abandon their claims.(13)
Fourth, the NPRM would affect people who are already living and working in our communities in addition to those who arrive in the future seeking asylum. This constitutes a violation of the long-standing presumption that laws will apply prospectively and not retroactively. The proposed rule would impact workers who previously held other lawful statuses like Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”), humanitarian parole, or deferred action and are now applying for asylum.(14) It would also apply to asylum seekers who already have work permits but would face new barriers and delays when renewing them. In practice, the rule would disrupt both new arrivals and long-established community members, along with their families, employers, community organizations, and service systems.
Fifth, these threatened harms would be compounded by other recent changes to work permit rules that are already impacting our communities. For example, in November 2025, USCIS issued an Interim Final Rule eliminating the automatic extension of work permits for asylum seekers who are in the process of renewing their valid work permits.(15) And in December 2025, USCIS reduced the maximum EAD validity period for asylum applicants with pending asylum applications from five years to eighteen months.(16) These changes are already creating greater uncertainty for workers and businesses by shortening the windows of reliable work authorization and removing safeguards against processing delays.
The NPRM does not reflect a good-faith effort to improve a longstanding, predictable system. Instead, it would effectively shut down access to asylum by making it economically impossible for people to support themselves while their claims are pending, inflicting profound harm on our residents. It should be withdrawn in full.
III. The Proposed Rule Would Harm States
DHS’s Proposed Rule would also directly harm states by destabilizing their economies, weakening their workforces, increasing exploitation, and shifting significant costs onto state and local systems.
A. The NPRM Would Shrink the Authorized Workforce and Weaken State and Local Economies.
The Proposed Rule would reduce the available workforce by delaying or preventing asylum seekers from entering and remaining in lawful employment, undermining businesses that depend on a stable labor supply. Employers across Lab states already face staffing shortages. Labor demand is especially acute in sectors like healthcare and childcare. Virginia faces especially competitive labor markets in manufacturing.(17) In Iowa, immigrants are disproportionately represented in key industries like agriculture and transportation.(18) Nationwide, the construction industry depends on the work of approximately 400,000 asylum seekers, of whom 34,000 are in Georgia and 24,000 are in each of Ohio and North Carolina.(19) In Wisconsin, an estimated 13,000 asylum seekers work in manufacturing.(20)
This contraction would ripple across state and local economies. Businesses would face increased uncertainty, higher turnover and retraining costs, and delayed hiring and investment decisions. These effects would constrain business growth and entrepreneurship, reduce productivity, and place additional strain on remaining workers.(21)
The Proposed Rule would also remove significant consumer spending from local economies. By its own estimates, the Proposed Rule would lead to lost compensation that “could range from $34.6 billion to $126.6 billion annually.”(22) When permitted to work, asylum seekers spend their earnings on housing, food, transportation, and other goods and services, supporting local businesses and generating economic activity. By effectively preventing asylum seekers from accessing lawful work, the rule would extract these dollars from state economies.
These harms extend to the availability and affordability of goods and services. Asylum seekers in Lab states work across industries critical to daily life, including childcare, healthcare, construction, food service, transportation, and others. Delaying or denying their ability to work would reduce output in these sectors, making it harder for residents to access essential services and driving up costs for everyone.
B. The NPRM Would Push Many Workers into Exploitative Underground Labor Markets While Hindering Lab States’ Ability to Protect Workers.
By restricting access to lawful work, the Proposed Rule would push thousands of asylum seekers out of formal labor markets. Asylum seekers must earn income to meet basic needs and support their families and to pursue their asylum claims. Many will be driven to accept off-the-books employment out of necessity. Asylum seekers’ need to earn income makes them particularly susceptible to exploitation including wage theft and work in unsafe and unlawful working conditions.(23) The NPRM would heighten these risks and shift additional burdens onto states to detect, prevent, and respond to labor violations. As a result, the Proposed Rule would not only increase the prevalence of exploitative practices but also shift additional burdens onto states to identify, investigate, and respond to labor violations.
C. The Proposed Rule Would Reduce Revenues and Increase Costs for State and Local Systems.
By limiting or cutting off asylum seekers’ access to lawful work, the Proposed Rule would both reduce state revenues and increase demands on public systems. The NPRM’s provisions would diminish payroll and sales tax revenues by preventing asylum seekers from earning taxable income and reducing their taxable spending in local economies. These revenues (estimated at $14 billion per year) fund essential services, including funds that support public school systems, transportation, services like Medicaid and CHIP that are vital for all residents, and public safety.(24) Reductions in this revenue would result in Lab States being forced to reduce or decrease the quality of services that all of its residents depend on.
At the same time, the NPRM would increase demand for state and local services. When individuals are unable to support themselves through work, states are left to fill the gap. Healthcare systems would face increased uncompensated care costs as uninsured individuals seek treatment.(25) Other safety-net programs for food assistance, housing support, and energy assistance would experience increased demand, placing additional strain on already limited resources.
The Proposed Rule would also impose administrative burdens on state and local governments. As the first point of contact for many residents, these governments would be required not only to explain complex and changing requirements, but also to help individuals navigate the resulting barriers to employment and daily life. DHS fails to meaningfully account for these impacts. While acknowledging potential tax losses, it does not attempt to estimate losses to state and local revenues, including sales taxes and other non-employment sources, and it offers no evidence that any offsetting reductions in “strain on resources” would materialize.(26) DHS’s unsupported assumptions about forgone tax revenues cannot justify the real and significant fiscal harms the Proposed Rule would impose on states.
By leaving asylum seekers unable to sustain themselves legally for years while their asylum applications are pending, the NPRM would both reduce state tax revenues and shift significant costs onto state and local governments, which would be left to meet basic needs that individuals would otherwise be able to cover through lawful employment.
IV. Requested Action and Conclusion
The Proposed Rule would harm our residents and economy, destabilize our workforce, shift significant costs onto state and local governments, and undermine our commitment to supporting people seeking refuge in our communities. Accordingly, DHS should withdraw the Proposed Rule in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
Balqees Mihirg
Senior Policy Counsel
Refugee Advocacy Lab
Footnotes:
1. This figure is taken by adding the pending affirmative and defensive asylum cases, which total roughly 3.4 million. The total foreign-born population of the United States is approximately 47.8 million. By dividing the total immigrant population from the national total (for example, Georgia has 1.3 million immigrants of the 47.8 million nationally), we can then multiply the percentage of immigrants by the total asylum seeker population. This leads us to believe that approximately 493,000 asylum seekers live in the ten Lab states. We then further consider that not all asylum seekers have employment authorization or are of working age. This leads us to a conservative outcome of approximately 246,000 total individuals likely to lose employment authorization under this rule. This estimate does not include future asylum applicants. The resulting numbers mirror closely the estimates made by WorkPermits.US using established demographic estimate tools and data sets.
2. WorkPermits.US, https://data.workpermits.us/asylum-workforce-report/, accessed April 22, 2026.
3. Id.
4. See Rules and Procedures for Adjudication of Applications for Asylum or Withholding of Deportation and for Employment Authorization, 59 Fed. Reg. 14,779, 14,780 (proposed Mar. 30, 1994) (describing 150 days “as the period beyond which it would not be appropriate to deny work authorization to a person whose [asylum] claim has not been adjudicated”).
5. Fwd.US, People Seeking Asylum are Contributing to the Workforce, January 31st, 2026, https://www.fwd.us/news/people-seeking-asylum-are-contributing-to-the-workforce/.
6. WorkPermits.US. State Snapshot, accessed April 22, 2026.
7. WorkPermits.US. State Snapshot, accessed April 22, 2026.
8. See Ken Hudson, States Facing Worker Shortages Are Helping Migrants Secure Employment with New Resource Clinics, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Dec. 8, 2023), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/blog/states-worker-shortages-help-migrants-employment/.
9. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,698 (“Initial applications for employment authorization received on or after [the final rule’s effective date] under this section, may be submitted no earlier than 365 calendar days after the date on which a complete asylum application submitted in accordance with [8 C.F.R.] §§ 208.3 and 208.4 or §§ 1208.3 and 1208.4 has been received.”); id. at 8,699 (“USCIS will have 180 days to adjudicate an initial application for employment authorization, except for those applications requiring additional review for background checks or vetting.”); contra 8 CFR §§ 274a.12(c)(8); 208.7(a) (current regulations setting forth the 150-day wait and 30-day processing timeline); Gonzalez Rosario v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., 365 F. Supp. 3d 1156 (W.D. Wash. 2018) (enjoining USCIS from further failing to adhere to the strict 30-day deadline for adjudicating EAD applications for asylum applicants).
10. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,618 (DHS proposes new technical compliance requirements for asylum applications to be accepted, and “also proposes to remove the language in 8 CFR 208.3(c)(3) providing that an application for asylum will be deemed ‘complete’ if USCIS fails to return the incomplete application to the alien within a 30-day period”); id. at 8,698 (replacing the “deemed complete” section with “The receipt of an asylum application will begin the 365 calendar-day waiting period after which the applicant may file an application for employment authorization in accordance with § 208.7. If an asylum application does not comply with the requirements of § 103.2(a) of this chapter or the form instructions, the asylum application will be deemed incomplete. USCIS will reject and return an application that is incomplete”).
11. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,617 (describing the pause); id. at 8,650 (predicting the first pause will last between 14 and 173 years, or longer).
12. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,661.
13. Id. at 8,664.
14. Millions of individuals entered or remained in the United States during the prior administration through these lawful pathways. Now the Administration seeks to terminate these statuses and the employment authorization that accompanies them. For example, the Proposed Rule would govern applications submitted by individuals who have already lawfully been working in the United States under the TPS program but are seeking an asylum-based work authorization for the first time after their country’s TPS designation was terminated. See 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,652–53 (acknowledging former TPS, parole, and Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals holders often apply for asylum). The TPS program applies to nationals of specifically designated countries that are confronting an ongoing armed conflict, environmental disaster, or extraordinary and temporary condition. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1).
15. Removal of the Automatic Extension of Employment Authorization Documents, 90 Fed. Reg. 48,799 (Oct. 30, 2025).
16. U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs., Policy Alert PA-2025-27: Updating Certain Employment Authorization Document Validity Periods at 2 (Dec. 4, 2025) (“Updates the maximum validity period for initial and renewal EADs from 5 years to 18 months for those admitted as refugees, granted asylum, granted withholding of deportation or removal, for those with pending applications for asylum or withholding of removal[.]”).
17. MIE Solutions, Report: U.S. Manufacturing Labor Shortages and Hiring Pressures in 2026, https://mie-solutions.com/u-s-manufacturing-labor-shortages-and-hiring-pressures-in-2026/
18. Pete Hird and Erica Johnson, “Iowa needs workers, but Iowa lawmakers are driving them away,” April 5, 2026, Des Moines Register, https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/opinion/columnists/iowa-view/2026/04/05/iowa-workforce-shortage-state-policy/89427003007/.
19. People seeking asylum are contributing to the workforce, FWD.US (Jan. 31, 2026), https://www.fwd.us/news/people-seeking-asylum-are-contributing-to-the-workforce/.
20. WorkPermits.US. State Snapshot, accessed April 22, 2026.
21. DHS acknowledges the Proposed Rule would harm businesses in multiple ways but “does not know” the extent of those harms. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,621. The Administrative Procedure Act requires DHS to assess the impacts of its rulemaking, and it has utterly failed to do so here.
22. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8621 (emphasis added).
23. See, e.g., Brief for Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. Of Indus. Orgs. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees, Svitalana Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (2025) (No. 25-1384), at 15–16 (when the hotel industry is faced with labor shortages, employers often use temporary labor agencies to supply workers, which not only “undermin[es] the wages and working conditions” for U.S. citizen workers employed by the hotel “by paying substandard wages and benefits,” but also “often violate[s] immigration law by hiring undocumented workers”); Josselyn Andrea Garcia Quijano, Workplace Discrimination and Undocumented First-Generation Latinx Immigrants, Univ. of Chic. Crown Fam. Sch. of Soc. Work, Pol’y, & Prac., Advocas’ F., https://crownschool.uchicago.edu/student-life/advocates-forum/workplace-discrimination-and-undocumented-first-generation-latinx (citing studies showing that workers without lawful authorization frequently experience exploitative conditions—including rigid work demands, unsafe labor, lack of basic protections, substandard wages, and widespread wage theft—and that workers are often reluctant to report abuses due to fear of retaliation or deportation) (last visited Mar. 19, 2026); Susan Ferriss & Joe Yerardi, Wage theft hits immigrants — hard, Ctr. for Pub. Integrity (Oct. 14, 2021), https://publicintegrity.org/inequality-poverty-opportunity/garment-immigrant-workers-wage-theft/.
24. Id.
25. These costs are ultimately absorbed by hospitals, taxpayers, and state and local governments through subsidies and uncompensated care programs. See Hidden Costs, Values Lost: Uninsurance in America, NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, Ch. 3, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK221653/.
26. 91 Fed. Reg. at 8,621.